Abstract: Academically, the principle of comity is all but dead. Not only is there a distinct lack of literature regarding the principle, but in circumstances where it is addressed it is considered to be of negligible importance for the resolution of modern private international law disputes. However, a review of Australian case law demonstrates that there is a significant disjunct between the academic view of comity and its actual use in judicial practice. In the last ten years, over 850 Australian court decisions have made reference to comity -many of which relate to the field of private international law. In this article, the authors review 77 Australian cases where comity played a definitive role in the resolution of private international law issues. These cases demonstrate that comity is a relevant, useful legal tool to guide the development and application of private international law rules -doing so in a manner that helpfully mediates between the political need to uphold the doctrine of sovereignty and the commercial and judicial need to permit law to act transnationally in order to accommodate international commerce. This is the purpose for which comity was created almost 400 years ago and the examined case law demonstrates that it continues to be effective in reflecting these interests in the law.
Introduction
How best to reconcile the basic political doctrines of the modern state system and the growing need to make the geography of the law match the geography of today's commercial realities? The rub lies in the fact that the modern state system is built on ideas of sovereignty and non-interference, while today's commercial realities have become increasingly transnational: they spill over the borders of any given State but are not distinctly international (in the sense of 'between States'). Whilst political, legislative and normative recommendations have been offered in abundance to reconcile these positions, modern transnational commerce (and the resolution of transnational disputes) is, in many ways, still hindered by traditional sovereign boundaries.
From a black-letter law perspective, an interesting yet so far quite under-researched part of the solution may be found in the principle of comity -this elusive concept that (mostly) everyone has heard of, but nobody can really define. Australian law offers some particularly 1 interesting insights in this regard. Comity thrives in Australia, though it is in half-covert action: a textbook account of Australian private international law tells us there is little to be seen, but our review of recent case law suggests a different reality. In many cases, comity 2 plays a definitive role in the development and application of Australian private international law rules and provides guidance to courts as to the appropriate exercise of their judicial power.
The fact that conventional literature has cold-shouldered the principle has led to insufficient knowledge, inadequate understanding and quite some confusion about what comity may or This article uses the term comity, doctrine of comity or concept of comity interchangeably. The concept is also known in 1 some jurisdictions to varying degrees as comitas gentium, courtoisie internationale and Völkercourtoisie. Prior studies of comity do exist but this has not dispelled the general confusion surrounding the principle. may not mean. This confusion is of course to the benefit of those who assert that comity 3 cannot play a significant role in the resolution of private international law issues. But this 4 conclusion is not self-evidently correct. There is confusion as to what comity entails -that is true. However, the case law demonstrates that from a judicial perspective comity continues to be considered an important and relevant part of Australian private international law. This paper seeks to shed light on the importance of comity in the development and application of Australian private international law rules through a review of relevant case law.
In doing so, it will attempt to sketch a functional definition of comity -one that takes into consideration comity's historical purpose and the way in which it is used by the Australian judiciary. Clarifying the meaning and role of comity through a functional definition may help unbridle comity's legal potential: the better it is understood, the better it can be applied and the more useful it becomes.
Importantly, this paper does not seek to analyse every instance of comity in Australian jurisprudence and should not be understood as a comprehensive guide to comity in Australia.
Rather, its aim is to shed light on the judicial importance given to comity by the Australian judiciary and sketch a definition of comity in practice by reference to Australian case law.
The primary purpose of this paper is to reposition comity as a useful and relevant principle of private international law worthy of further academic research. Whilst this paper focuses solely on Australian case law, its findings should be of interest to scholars and practitioners in other legal orders -particularly those that share a common legal tradition. 
The Idea of Comity
In 1648, after four years of negotiations, the Treaties of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War. In doing so, they contributed to the consolidation of the doctrine of sovereignty, thus 6 Paul, supra note 1 at 19-20 notes that scholars and courts outside of Australia have characterised comity as a choice of law 3 principle, a synonym for private international law, a rule of public international law, a moral obligation, expediency, courtesy, reciprocity, utility and diplomacy. Due to the lack of consideration of comity in Australian private international law literature, case law demonstrates that Australian courts have largely relied on foreign decisions to gain an understanding of comity.
Paul, supra note 1 at 19-20 notes that there is a perception that comity is too vague, incoherent, illusory and ephemeral to 4 be of any use.
Initial indications demonstrate that comity may play a similar role in the United Kingdom and to some extent in the United 5 States of America. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that comity is a civil law invention and thus may continue to play a role in civil law jurisdictions -particular those in Europe. Paul, supra note 1; Watson, supra note 1; Briggs, supra note 1.
Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia" (1949) 42 American Journal of International Law 20. 6 helping to establish the legal-political foundations for the modern state. In popular lore, the 7 Treaties actually established the modern state, but this is an exaggeration. Rather, the idea of 8 sovereignty was merely implied as part of the negotiations of the Treaties. It was thought 9 that a clear distribution of sovereign power would be a means to end the Thirty Years War and reduce the risk that something similar would happen again in the future. Two of the 10 great components of sovereignty -the principles of self-determination and non-interferencehelped establish an inter-national legal scene and clarify who had the right to do what on that scene.
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The Thirty Years War had been fuelled by an unclear overlap of political, secular and spiritual power. It was not only a bloody religious battle but also a great legal-political mess. It International Law 148 at 152.
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge, CUP, 2003) 21 at 25.
10
Georges Abi-Saab, "Cours général de droit international public" (1987) First, they aim to minimise the risk and occurrence of conflict arising; and second, they supply the legal tools to work out a solution when conflict does occur. Rules of private international law serve as an example -they too operate as 'limits of international law jurisdiction', expressions of concern relating to the international allocation of regulatory authority, of which they may be deemed a domestic implementation.
24
Comity, too, is one such instrument. It allows us to mediate those conflicts that may occur when more than one State believes it has a legitimate basis to exercise regulatory power.
When a court or legislature must determine whether to 'recognise' the legitimate exercise of regulatory power by another State, in situations of unavoidable conflict in which no rule provides an answer (or satisfactory answer) or where the applicable rule or rules require interpretation, comity, in principle, will come into play. Likewise, when a court or legislature must determine whether it has a legitimate claim that other States should 'recognise' its own legitimate exercise of regulatory power, comity, in principle, will again come into play. 'unacceptable' infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty in either circumstance is to be determined by weighing the gravity of the infringement against the commercial or judicial importance of the extra-jurisdictional use of regulatory powers. This balancing act, which comity embodies, is highly context specific, but a review of Australian case law provides significant guidance as to how comity is used for this purpose.
On the other hand, comity recognises that even if there is a commercial and judicial need to recognise the application of another State's laws or judicial power, it may constitute an unacceptable infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty. In such circumstances, comity will 'restrain' those acts to the extent that they constitute such an infringement. For States seeking to apply laws or exercise judicial power beyond the boundaries laid down by the doctrine of sovereignty and specific agreements, comity requires 'self-restraint' where it would constitute an undue infringement of another State's sovereignty. Likewise, comity enables States to 'restrain' the effect of foreign laws and judicial acts that have been applied or exercised by a foreign State that come within their sovereign regulatory scope on the basis that it poses an unacceptable infringement of their sovereignty.
Mills, supra note 20.
25
The result is that comity will be relevant in two common scenarios. The first is in circumstances where a court is, prima facie, permitted to apply domestic law or exercise its judicial power in an ostensibly unlimited manner, but it must determine how far and to what effect it would be appropriate. In these types of cases the question is one of 'self-restraint'
and whether or not the court can legitimately expect 'recognition' of its acts from a foreign
State. The second is in circumstances where a court must determine how far and to what extent it would be appropriate to recognise the effect of foreign laws or judicial power in its territory. In these types of cases the question is to what extent the court should 'restrain' or 'recognise' those foreign acts within its sovereign territory. In both cases a comity analysis will be appropriate, if not required, because behind each judicial act of recognition or restraint lies an intricate matrix of sovereign, commercial and judicial interests that are required to be reflected in the law. It bears noting that judicial power is not exercised for 'reasons of comity'. Rather, comity is the means by which courts weigh and balance the commercial and judicial need to permit the transnational application of law and the political need to uphold traditional conceptions of sovereignty.
Such an understanding of comity should provide useful guidance to courts regarding the appropriate exercise of their judicial power in individual private international law cases. The guidance will of course be soft, because it is for courts to determine whether the exercise of judicial power, in the circumstances of individual cases, will constitute an unacceptable infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty. However, even soft guidance may be critically helpful in drawing the right lines with regard to the exercise of judicial power in these types of cases. This is particularly so if that guidance is informed by a nuanced understanding of comity -one that takes into consideration its historical and systemic purpose and the interests it is attempting to reflect in the law. Indeed, an examination of Australian case law reveals many examples where comity has played an invaluable role in guiding the development and application of private international law rules in a manner consistent with relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial interests. Every statute is to be interpreted and applied as far as its language admits so as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or established rules of international law.
As stated above, this article does not seek to analyse all instances of comity in Australian jurisprudence. Rather, it seeks 26 to analyse areas of law where comity is particularly prevalent.
It bears noting that the High Court, which is the final court of appeal in Australia, has not laid down a definitive definition 27 of comity in Australia. However, it has on a number of occasions adopted and approved of the well known definition of comity formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v Guyot, which reads as follows: "'Comity', in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws": 
36
... comity between nations is a fine and proper thing, but it provides no basis whatsoever for this court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by parliament.
However, even when the presumption is rebutted, comity still plays a role of residual interpretation. Comity will still favour restriction of the judicial power to interpret legislation extra-territorially, but it is limited by the court's obligation to interpret legislation according to the intent of the legislature. What remains is the idea that legislation should be read, so far as possible, not to have an extra-territorial effect. For some, the application of a presumption as to the legislature's intent is artificial and unhelpful in the quest to determine the true application and scope of laws and legal principles. However, as Dixon J held in Barcelo,
37
the presumption exists to ensure that courts do not offend the sovereignty of foreign States, and thus undermine the doctrine of sovereignty.
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In this sense comity has guided the development and application of the presumption against extra-territoriality -strongly restricting the ability of courts to interpret legislation as having an effect outside Australian sovereign boundaries. However, comity only exists in the form of a presumption -not a rule. Arguably, if it were to exist in the form of a rule this would be too restrictive on domestic sovereignty and would restrict the courts from furthering legitimate commercial and judicial aims by extending the scope of legislation in certain cases. The presumption merely favours an interpretation against extra-territoriality on the basis that in most cases such an interpretation will unacceptably challenge the doctrine of sovereignty. By forming the basis for the presumption and guiding its application, comity is able to reflect relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial concerns in the law.
International instruments and contracts
Comity also plays a key role in the interpretation of international instruments and contracts.
In this context comity places restrictions on the court's interpretive process in an effort to achieve the commercial and judicial aim of transnationally consistent interpretation. Comity
Briggs, supra note 1 at 96. Briggs notes that as with many attempts to explain legal principles by reference to the 37 intention of the legislature it is simply not true. More often than not the legislature will not have given any thought to the appropriate scope of legislation. (1932) Ibid.
Barcelo v Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd
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Ibid.
48 the doctrine of sovereignty. Rather, their Honours merely held that comity required that considerable respect be given to the prior English judgment and that courts should bear in mind whether it is commercially and judicially desirable that a different interpretation be used. In doing so, they were able to use comity to further the commercial and judicial aim of transnationally consistent interpretation without offending foreign or domestic sovereignty.
Service outside the jurisdiction
The case law demonstrates that considerations of comity have also played, and continue to play, a significant role in the development and application of the law surrounding service outside the jurisdiction. In particular, the case law helps to highlight how comity is used by the courts to reflect changing sovereign, commercial and judicial interests in the law. Below we review the role of comity in relevant case law concerning the service of originating applications and subpoenas outside the jurisdiction. The case law demonstrates that comity plays differing roles depending on the effect of the service on the doctrine of sovereignty. The more likely the service is to be perceived as a challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty the more likely it is that comity will place restrictions on the court's ability to effect service. For example, in circumstances where a party seeks leave of the court to issue a subpoena outside the jurisdiction, comity will place significant restrictions on the court's ability to grant such leave on the basis that to do so is a direct exercise of domestic judicial power in a foreign State. In most cases, such an exercise of power will be considered an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty.
Conversely, in circumstances where a defendant applies to the court to set aside an originating application, comity will often not require that the court do so. This is because originating applications are generally not considered to be as grave an infringement to the doctrine of sovereignty as subpoenas -they merely serve to notify the defendant of the proceedings in Australia and give them the opportunity to choose whether or not to appear and defend those proceedings. Thus, whilst there may be commercial and judicial reasons to serve both subpoenas and originating applications, comity will place significant restrictions on the ability to serve the former, rather than the latter, because of its effect on foreign sovereignty.
The case law allows us to make further observations as to comity's role and ability to shape the law. In particular, the case law demonstrates that comity has been used effectively to reflect changing perceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and justice in the law. Changing perceptions of sovereignty and the need to develop transnational law, combined with developments in communications and transportation technology, have meant that comity need not act with the same restrictions as it did in the past. For example, in the context of originating applications, comity plays a far less restrictive role than it once did, permitting service of originating applications outside the jurisdiction in furtherance of commercial and judicial goals. Likewise, recent case law demonstrates that the longstanding restrictive nature of comity in the context of subpoenas may also be changing. In particular, a heated debate has arisen between members of the New South Wales Judiciary as to whether comity should reflect these same changing perceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and justice in the law concerning subpoenas.
3.3.1.Serving originating applications outside the jurisdiction
The law regarding the service of originating applications differs depending on the applicable civil procedure rules. Most civil procedure rules permit service outside the jurisdiction without prior leave of the court. In order for a plaintiff to serve an originating application 50 outside the jurisdiction without leave of the court, the plaintiff should satisfy the necessary criteria contained in the rules. Such criteria exist to establish a connection with the matter 51 so that the court is not likely to be perceived as inappropriately assuming jurisdiction. If the 52 plaintiff cannot fulfil the criteria for service without leave they may apply to the court seeking leave to serve outside the jurisdiction. 53 In general, an originating application will be served outside the jurisdiction without prior leave of the court. Thus, comity will not be relevant at the service stage. However, considerations of comity do become relevant in circumstances where the plaintiff seeks leave to proceed against the defendant (where the defendant does not enter an appearance) or the 54 defendant applies to the court to set aside the originating application. In the past, rightly noted in its reasons in these matters, contemporary developments in communications and transport make the degree of "inconvenience and annoyance" to which a foreign defendant would be put, if brought into the courts of this jurisdiction, "of a qualitatively different order to that which existed in 1885."
The considerations of comity and restraint, to which reference has so often been made in cases concerning service out of the jurisdiction, will often be of greatest relevance in considering questions of forum non conveniens. The starting point for the present enquiry, however, must be the terms of the Rules, not any general considerations of the kind just mentioned. 59
In the High Court's opinion, in circumstances where the civil procedure rules provided plaintiffs with the power to serve originating applications outside the jurisdiction without leave of the court, comity was no longer required to play such a restrictive role. Rather, In the context of originating applications, it is important to note that the role of comity has not changed. Comity is still used by the courts to reflect relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial interests in the law. However, its effect has changed as a result of changes in these interests. More specifically, the case law demonstrates that comity no longer acts with the to consider the service of originating applications in their territory as an infringement of their sovereignty and more likely to recognise the commercial and judicial need for such service.
In these circumstances, comity need not act with the same restraint it once did and may help facilitate the development of transnational law in furtherance of relevant commercial and judicial aims.
The criteria that parties must satisfy to be permitted to serve without leave ensures that there will be little to no interference with the sovereignty of foreign State and that the service of originating applications will not pose an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty. In circumstances where parties do not satisfy the criteria they will be required to seek leave of the court to serve outside the jurisdiction. However, the decision in Agar means that considerations of comity need not act with the same restrictive force they once did. Such a position enables courts to establish a balance between facilitating commercial and judicial interests whilst protecting the doctrine of sovereignty.
3.3.2.Serving subpoenas outside the jurisdiction
Subpoenas require leave of the court as they are, in effect, a compulsory order of the court requiring a party to appear or do some act. A person who is issued with a subpoena, but fails to comply with it, will be liable for punishment for failing to comply with an order of the court. Thus, the granting of leave to issue a subpoena constitutes a stronger and more direct exercise of judicial power because of its compulsive nature. In 1990, Rogers CJ Comm D in
Arhill summarised the position with regard to the service of subpoenas outside the 67 jurisdiction:
It is at the heart of the exercise of jurisdiction, by courts taking their system from England that, jurisdiction rests on presence or submission. Relevantly that is recognised in the concept that the courts of a State will exercise jurisdiction over circumstances. However, these circumstances are, in every case, most carefully defined in a manner which maintains a relationship between the action, in relation to which the process is sought to be served, and the State. Even so, the exercise of such jurisdiction has been described as "exorbitant" jurisdiction…
Another way of stating the point is, "that a foreigner, resident abroad, will not lightly be subjected to a local jurisdiction". The basis of that approach lies essentially in the respect which a State has for the sovereignty of another State. In other words, without the consent of the other State, the sovereign does not seek to exercise its rights and powers, in relation to legal proceedings, within the territory of another ...
[There is] clear [statutory] authority for the Court to give leave to serve a subpoena outside Australia. The fact that an order made pursuant to it could, in some instances, involve an infringement of the sovereignty of another country does not mean that it is a reason for holding the rule to be invalid. Nonetheless, the rule should be construed consistently with "the established criteria of international law with regard to comity". 68
For Rogers CJ Comm D, this meant that it would be contrary to comity to grant leave to issue a subpoena outside the jurisdiction in the case at hand. This was so even though the relevant civil procedure rule contained the necessary power to grant it. In essence, the decision in exercise its domestic judicial power in the territory of another, this is likely to be considered by the latter as a breach of its sovereignty.
When Arhill was decided in 1990, comity was used by the courts to reinforce the political need to uphold the doctrine of sovereignty. Whilst comity did not constitute a complete bar to the exercise of the judicial power, it did culminate in the creation of precedent that strongly favoured restriction of the judicial power even where there were significant commercial and judicial reasons for its exercise. Later decisions after 2000 demonstrate a similar position. It is important to note that the disagreement between Hallen AsJ and White J is not in regard to the content, purpose or role of comity. Rather, the disagreement is to comity's ultimate effect -the former considered the issuance of the subpoena not to infringe the doctrine of sovereignty whilst the latter did. In White J's opinion, the principle in Agar could not be extended to the context of issuing subpoenas, because subpoenas pose a greater challenge to the sovereignty of foreign States than originating applications. The difference is that service of an originating application merely notifies the defendant of the proceedings in Australia and gives them the opportunity to choose whether or not to appear and defend those proceedings.
Conversely, granting leave to issue a subpoena constitutes a stronger, more direct exercise of judicial power because of its compulsive nature. A person who is issued with a subpoena, but fails to comply with it, will be liable for punishment for failing to comply with an order of the court. An originating application has no coercive power, but a subpoena compels the recipient to do something with the penalty for non-compliance being contempt of court. Evidently, a nuanced understanding of comity -including its historical purpose and the interests it seeks to reflect in the law -will provide courts with the guidance they need to exercise their judicial power appropriately in individual cases.
Service outside the jurisdiction in accordance with international conventions
When service is conducted in accordance with a valid international convention there will be In Clifton, White J (who also delivered the judgement in Gloucester) held that leave to serve an originating application in China would not raise any issues of comity if it were served in accordance with the Hague Convention to which Australia and China were both party to.
Likewise, in Donnelly, which dealt with an examination summons, Farrell J held that service carried out in accordance with accepted procedures for international proceedings demonstrated that a foreign State would not perceive service within its territory as a breach of its sovereignty. Accordingly, service in this manner would not challenge the doctrine of sovereignty.
Domestic law that requires the contravention of foreign law
Implicitly ordering the contravention of foreign law can also amount to a challenge of a foreign State's sovereignty -a challenge of the type that comity takes into consideration, and weighs against often competing domestic sovereign interests and commercial and judicial necessity. In Suzlon Energy Ltd three Swiss banks applied to set aside notices to produce 88 documents or an order that each bank be excused from producing documents on the basis that compliance with the notices would result in each bank being required to contravene the Swiss that the court assess whether there are domestic sovereign, commercial and judicial concerns at stake that are so great that the court should compel the litigant in the circumstances of the particular case. Whether the interests of enforcing a particular law are so commercially and judicially necessary (and important to the domestic sovereignty of Australia) as to warrant its enforcement depends on a number of factors including the significance of the proceedings, public interest, criminal penalties and the availability of alternate means by which a party may comply with the order without the risk of contravening foreign law.
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The general position is that comity has formed the basis for precedent which strongly favours restriction of the judicial power to grant orders or enforce laws that have the potential to infringe the laws of foreign States. This is the case even in circumstances where the 4. The determination of jurisdiction and the selection of forum
Stay of proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens and the granting of anti-suit injunctions
Comity plays one of its most definitive and well-known roles in cases concerning stays on grounds of forum non conveniens and the granting of anti-suit injunctions. In particular, the role of comity has gained most attention in the context of granting anti-suit injunctions. This is because many States, particularly those from civil law traditions, consider the use of antisuit injunctions to be a breach of their sovereignty regardless of the commercial and judicial reasons for which they were granted.
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From a commercial and judicial point of view, disputes should generally be litigated in the court with which the matter has the strongest connection. The idea is that justice is more likely to be served, and in a more economical fashion, if the court which entertains the matter is the court which is the closest to the matter. Anti-suit injunctions and stays on grounds of forum non conveniens are aimed at furthering these commercial and judicial aims. However, their application is necessarily tempered by concerns for sovereignty -both foreign and domestic. Thus, courts have used comity to shape and develop the law surrounding anti-suit injunctions and forum non conveniens in order to reflect these nuanced sovereign, commercial and judicial interests in the law.
4.1.1.The role of comity in granting stay orders on grounds of forum non conveniens
In this area of law the principle of comity has shaped the development and application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In particular, the adoption of the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test now used by Australian courts was based on the perception that it is more in conformance with the dictates of comity than the 'more appropriate forum' test found in English jurisprudence. The development and application of the doctrine permits Australian courts to reflect in the law relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial needs from an Australian perspective.
In England, the House of Lords in Spiliada laid down the 'more appropriate forum' test for 97 granting stays on grounds of forum non conveniens. Lord Goff (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) held that the burden resting on the party applying for the stay '... is not just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but to establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum.' Thus, in circumstances where there is another forum which is the natural 98 or more appropriate forum, English courts will ordinarily grant a stay unless there are extenuating circumstances that make it unjust to do so.
In Australia, the High Court rejected the 'more appropriate forum' test as it exists in England, instead favouring the inward facing 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. In Australia, the 99 touchstone is inappropriateness, not comparative appropriateness. Thus, the focus of the test is on the inappropriateness of the Australian court to resolve the dispute, not the comparative appropriateness of other forums. An Australian court does not become an inappropriate forum simply because another forum is deemed more appropriate. The test thereby 100 becomes significantly more onerous for the party seeking the stay. When determining whether a stay should be granted, the 'more appropriate forum' test used in England requires that courts consider whether or not the plaintiff will obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction. The High Court held that a test that requires a court to pass judgement 102 on the quality or willingness of a foreign court to deliver justice is particularly offensive to the sovereignty of foreign States and therefore posed an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty.
Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd
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Conversely, the High Court was of the opinion that the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test was more respectful of foreign sovereignty as it merely required that the Australian court determine its own appropriateness to be the forum to entertain a particular matter. The High
Court held that the fact the test was inward facing -in that it evaluated the Australian court's appropriateness rather than the foreign court's ability or willingness to deliver justice -was more in conformance with the commands of comity. 104
Interestingly however, the High Court seemed to overlook the fact that in certain cases the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test may also contradict the dictates of comity. Whilst the High Court adopted the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test to avoid having to pass judgement on the competency or willingness of foreign courts, the result of the test is that in some cases Australian courts will not grant a stay despite a foreign court being the natural or more appropriate forum. In circumstances where it is clear that a foreign court is clearly more suitable than the Australian court, but it cannot be said that the Australian court itself is 'clearly inappropriate', Australian courts will refuse to grant a stay. Such a result is contrary to considerations of comity for it offends the sovereign interests of foreign States who have a legitimate, and potentially stronger, sovereign interest in entertaining the dispute and fails to Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) principle which commanded general acceptance among other countries, it would obviously be desirable in the interests of international comity' that it also be adopted in Australia. 111
Transnational consistency is both a commercially and judicially desirable thing and comity requires that Australian courts strive for such an aim where possible.
Evidently, the dictates of comity were pulling in two different direction: (1) in favour of adopting a test that was generally accepted; and (2) (1981 ) 454 US 235, Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert(1947 ) 330 US 501 and Koster v Lumbermens Mutual Co (1947 ) 330 US 518: Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990 171 CLR 538 at 560-561 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ. seemed to recognise the commercial and judicial need to create uniform translation law or at least harmonise transnational solutions to transnational problems. Such a position reflects a move away from the national to the transnational, from the strict compartmentalisation of
States and their laws to States as players in a transnational legal game. Most interestingly, the High Court recognised that comity was the language of this change.
4.1.2.The role of comity in granting anti-suit injunctions
Comity has also played, and continues to play, a key role in the development and application of the law surrounding the granting of anti-suit injunctions. Despite operating in personamin that they work to restrain parties rather than foreign courts -anti-suit injunctions nevertheless interfere, albeit indirectly, with the processes of foreign courts. This has led some States to consider the use of anti-suit injunctions to be an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty -regardless of the circumstances of the case. However, Australian 113 courts recognise that, despite their interference with the sovereignty of foreign States, in certain circumstances anti-suit injunctions will not pose an 'unacceptable' challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty. For this reason, comity will always be a relevant consideration in the determination of whether or not an anti-suit injunction should be granted.
Due to the interference caused by anti-suit injunctions with the processes of foreign courts, comity favours restriction of the power to grant anti-suit injunctions. However, it does not pose a complete bar to the exercise of the power, recognising that in certain circumstances there may be a commercial and judicial interest in exercising the power and that it will not always constitute an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty. In CSR Ltd the 114 High Court held that comity demands courts proceed very carefully when considering the use of their judicial power to grant anti-suit injunctions, whether it be founded in the court's inherent or equitable jurisdiction. The result is that courts are required to balance the 115 likelihood that the exercise of power will be considered an unacceptable challenge to the help illustrate how courts make this judgement in practice. In each case, an anti-suit injunction was granted with each Court holding that the existence of significant commercial and judicial reasons favoured the granting of an anti-suit injunction, while the lack of any real connection between the matter and the foreign jurisdiction meant that it was unlikely that the foreign State would perceive the anti-suit injunction as a breach of their sovereignty. In 118 each case the Court conducted a balancing exercise between these two factors -on the one hand, the commercial and judicial need to exercise the power, and on the other, the need to ensure courts do not unacceptably challenge the doctrine of sovereignty by unduly interfering in the processes of foreign court.
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The case law demonstrates that in determining whether an anti-suit injunction should be granted the court will outline the existence of significant commercial and judicial needs to exercise the power. The commercial and judicial needs are required to be significant because the infringement caused by the anti-suit injunction to the sovereignty of the foreign State is unlikely to be light either. If such commercial and judicial needs are established, comity demands that the court weigh these considerations against the foreign State's sovereign interests.
From a sovereign interest perspective, comity demands that the court undertake an analysis of the connecting factors between the matter and the foreign jurisdiction to determine the level of interference the anti-suit injunction will have in the foreign jurisdiction. The closer the connection between the matter and the foreign jurisdiction, the more difficult it will be to grant the anti-suit injunction. In situations where it is commercially and judicially important to grant an anti-suit injunction, courts often stress the lack of connection between the matter judicial aims all point in the same direction -recognising the creation of foreign legal entities in Australia is commercially and judicially desirable and at the same time respects both domestic and foreign sovereignty.
The preclusionary doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel
With only limited exceptions, Australian courts will not challenge the authority of foreign judgements even where the reasoning of such judgements would be open to criticism. The 134 position is reflected in the law through the preclusionary doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel.
In addition to applying to domestic judgements, these three preclusionary doctrines, in principle, also apply to foreign judgements. For res judicata, the law is settled -res judicata may arise from a foreign judgement. The purpose of these preclusionary doctrines is to promote the finality of litigation. The 139 rationale is that commercial and judicial reality dictates that it is inefficient and inequitable to allow the same matter to be heard multiple times -multiple times within the same jurisdiction or multiple times in multiple jurisdictions. These commercial and judicial interests are of obvious concern. However, they must be weighed against the sovereign concerns of the foreign State and Australia. requires that the court give due recognition to the foreign judgement. In this context, the commercial and judicial need for finality will generally align with the foreign sovereign need to respect the judgments of the foreign court.
However, domestic sovereign concerns must also be taken into consideration. Under the doctrine of sovereignty, States have the right to self-determination and are not bound by the decisions of foreign courts. Concerns for domestic sovereignty would thus appear to pull the other way -against recognition of the foreign judgement and permitting Australian courts to reopen already adjudicated matters. However, by forming the basis for the preclusionary doctrines, comity has enabled courts to reconcile these domestic sovereign concerns with foreign sovereign needs and the commercial and judicial need for finality of litigation.
Where a foreign decision is required to be recognised by application of one of the preclusionary doctrines this does not amount to an unacceptable challenge of domestic sovereignty. Under the doctrine of sovereignty each State has the ability to determine how it will deal with matters that fall within its sovereign regulatory scope, including the ability to develop and apply preclusionary doctrines that direct courts as to how to deal with foreign judgements. In this sense, Australian courts are not bound by the decisions of foreign courts.
Rather, they are, by developing and applying these preclusionary doctrines, choosing to recognise the effect of foreign judgements in Australia as long as they meet the minimum requirements necessary to respect domestic sovereign concerns. In this sense, comity has shaped the preclusionary doctrines in a manner that is respectful of both domestic and foreign sovereignty and permits the courts to further the commercial and judicial aim of finality in litigation.
Recognition of foreign judgements
Foreign judgements can typically be refused recognition if they are not consistent with public policy. This is the case in Australia, as it is in most jurisdictions. Here, the main effect of comity is to shape the public policy exception and determine under what conditions foreign judgements may be refused recognition.
As is the case with the preclusionary doctrines, it is both commercially and judicially desirable that once matters have been adjudicated they should not be subject to re-litigation.
Thus, there is a general commercial and judicial interest in recognising foreign decisions.
Likewise, the due recognition of foreign decisions also respects the sovereignty of foreign
States. However, at the same time there are also domestic sovereign concerns that need to be taken into consideration. In some cases, certain foreign decisions may be considered offensive to domestic sovereignty.
Comity reflects this position in the law by shaping the public policy exception in a manner that makes it difficult for applicants to succeed in cases where they seek an order from the court refusing recognition. In order for the requirements of the public policy exception to be met there needs to be significant reasons why the foreign decision should not be recognised.
The authorities demonstrate that courts are generally slow to accept public policy as a ground for refusal and there are only a few instances in which foreign judgements have not been recognised on this basis. For the public policy exception to be successfully invoked, recognition must offend some principle of Australian public policy so sacrosanct that it is required to be maintained at all costs -including the cost of possibly offending a foreign State's sovereignty.
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The weight of the public policy concerns must be significant because the opposing foreign sovereign interests are not light either. As Kirby P, as he was then, held in Bouton, 144 'interests of comity are not served if the courts of the common law are too eager to criticise the standards of the courts and tribunals of another jurisdiction.' Likewise, in Jenton
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Overseas Investment, Whelan J, making reference to the decision in Bouton, insisted on the 
Conclusion
This article has sought to shed light on the importance of comity in the development and application of Australian private international law rules through an analysis of its use by the Australian judiciary. It has shown that Australian courts use comity quite often and in quite significant ways for the critical task of navigating sovereign sensitivities and transnational economic realities. In this context, case law demonstrates that comity is a flexible and adaptive legal tool that permits courts to guide and shape the development and application of private international law rules in a manner consistent with relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial interests. United States of America. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that comity is a civil law invention and thus may continue to be relevant in civil law jurisdictions -particularly those in Europe. Paul, supra note 1 at 22; Watson, supra note 1; Collins, supra note 1 at 89; Briggs, supra note 1 at 65
